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EVIDENCE AND PROOF UNDER WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWS.
Under the old law of employers' liability the working
people felt it a grievance that the burden of proof rested
always upon them and that hearsay evidence of statements
by deceased workmen as to the causes of their injuries,
although often seemingly deserving of credibility, was always
inadmissible. Consequently, in conjunction with the move-
ment to substitute the compensation law in place of the old
law of employers' liability there has commonly been a de-
mand by the working people for relaxations in their favor
of the rule of burden of proof and of the rules of evidence.
That demand, as will be adverted to again later, has had
no effect on the letter of European compensation acts.
But in the compensation acts of many of our States pro-
visions have been incorporated to the effect that the tri-
bunal which determines issues of fact shall not be bound by
the common law or statutory rules of evidence.' And the
acts of four States-Maryland, Montana, New York and
Oklahoma-go a step further and create presumptions open
to constructions that would reverse the burden of proof.
'California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, Washington and West Virginia. In the
Iowa and New Jersey acts a similar provision applies to the tribunals of first
instance; but that tribunal's decisions seem to be subject to review upon the
facts. The Missouri, Montana and Vermont acts provide that the tribunals
shall not be governed by "technical" rules of evidence.
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For a study of the questions raised by these provisions,
the particular provisions of the New York act2 will serve
as the text. They are as follows:
"Sec. 68. Technical rules of evidence or procedure not
required. The commission * * * in maldng an investigation
or inquiry or conducting a hearing shall not be bound by common
law or statutory rules of evidence or technical or formal rules of
procedure * * *; but may make such investigation or con-
duct such hearing in such manner as to ascertain the substantial
rights of the parties."
"Sec. ai. Presumptions. In any proceeding for the en-
forcement of a claim for compensation * * * , it shall be
presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary"i. That the claim comes within the provisions of this
chapter;
"2. That sufficient notice thereof was given;
"3. That the injury was not occasioned by the wilful inten-
tion of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death
of himself or another;
" 4. That the injury did not result solely from the intoxica-
tion of the injured employee while on duty."
Under the compensation law "intent to injure" and "in-
toxication" are logically defenses, the burden of proving
which unquestionably should rest upon the defendant.
Therefore subdivisions 3 and 4 of §21, supra, call for no
particular criticism, and attention will be confined to the
remaining provisions above quoted.
The following is a summary of the decisions by the New
York courts, to date, construing those provisions, arranged
for convenience under topical headings. It is necessary to
enter intensively into details in this summary in order to
present clearly two divergent lines of construction, the one
sought to be established by the Industrial Commission and
a minority of the judges of the appellate courts and the
other adopted by the majority of such judges.
Sec. 68-Hearsay Evidence.
Where an employee died from delirium tremens and his
widow and physicians testified that he had told them he had
suffered an accident such as might have aggravated or accelerated
2 Chap. 67 of the "Consolidated Laws," entitled the "Workmen's Com-
pensation Law," being Chap. 816, Laws of 1913, reenacted by Chap. 41, Laws
of 1914, as amended.
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the disease, but there were no marks on his body to indicate an
accidental injury, and several eye-witnesses testified that they
were present at the time and place of the alleged accident and
saw nothing of the kind, an award by the Industrial Commission
in favor of the widow, after affirmance by the Appellate Division,
was reversed by the Court of Appeals, on the ground that,*while
the Commission may in its discretion accept any evidence that is
offered, still in the end there must be a residum of legal evidence
to support the claim before an award can be made. The Chief
Judge concurred in the result on the ground that an award may
not be based upon hearsay evidence alone when such hearsay
evidence is contradicted by eye-witnesses. Two judges dissented.3
And where a builder's workman died from blood clot and
pressure on the brain, after falling on the earthen floor of a cellar,
his fellow workmen not seeing him fall but immediately observing
him and finding him unconscious, trembling and frothing at the
mouth, and the only evidence of an accident was his statement to
his widow that he had tripped and fallen, contradicted by his
statement to the attending physician that he did not know what
had happened to him, an award by the Commission in favor of
the widow was reversed by the Court of Appeals (two judges
dissenting), on the ground that it was based upon mere guess or
conjecture, without any legal basis therefor. 4
But where a workman died from peritonitis and the only
evidence of an accident was the employer's report thereof and
hearsay evidence of statements by the deceased to his wife, son
and attending physician, an award in favor of dependents was
affirmed upon appeal, on the ground that in this case there were
no denials of the accident by persons present at the time nor was
the evidence "abhorrent to reason and common sense" as in the
Carroll case. 5
Where the deceased workman had made an immediate state-
ment of the alleged accident to a co-employee, followed promptly
by like statements to his wife and others, an award in favor of
his widow was unanimously affirmed upon appeal, on the ground
that such award was amply corroborated by facts, circumstances
and evidence other than the declarations of the deceased and
that no substantial evidence was offered to overcome the presump-
tion "created by §21.6
And an award based upon hearsay evidence, received with-
out objection, was unanimously affirmed in Hernon v. Holahan.7
3 Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435 (July, i916). To similar
effect, see Belchery v. Carthage Machine Co., 224 N. Y. 326 (1918), three judges
dissenting.
4 Hansen v. Turner Construction Co., 224 N. Y. 331 (1918).
5 Lindquist v. Holler, 178 App. Div. 317 (N. Y. 1917).
6 Folts v. Robertson, x88 App. Div. 359 (N. Y. i919).
7 182 App. Div. 126 (N. Y. 1918).
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Sec. 68-Not the Best Evidence.
Where the mother of a fatally injured employee, residing
in Germany, claimed compensation as a "dependent" of such
employee, and the only evidence of dependency consisted of state-
ments by her son-in-law that he had been told by the deceased
that the latter had been sending money to his mother in Germany,
but in what amounts or how often the deceased did not tell the
witness, an award in favor of the mother was reversed upon appeal,
on the ground that better evidence on the disputed question was
obtainable and should have been offered.8
And an award for dependency on a deceased employee to
parents residing in Italy, based solely upon documents purporting
to be by the authorities of the town in Italy where the alleged
dependents resided and stating that the latter were very poor
and absolutely depended upon the deceased for support, was re-
versed upon appeal (two justices dissenting), on the ground that
there is no presumption of dependency and that no reason seems
to exist why the requirement of evidence should not be the same
in reference to the persons who are to receive the benefits, as upon
the question of the accident, etc.9
Sec. 27, subdiv. i-Burden of Proof-Employment Subject to
the Act.
Where a painter, injured by falling from a scaffold, claimed
the benefits of the compensation act, although the evidence all
indicated that he was an independent contractor, it was held by
the Appellate Division (two justices dissenting), reversing the
Commission, that there was a presumption that the claim came
within the provisions of the act and consequently that the claimant
was an "employee. 10 But, the case coming up again on appeal,
after rehearing, the Appellate Division reversed its former de-
cision; and the Court of Appeals affirmed the later decision, hold-
ing summarily that the claimant was not an "employee" but an
independent contractor, and therefore not subject to the act.u
And, the same question coming up again later on appeal,
the Appellate Division reversed an award in favor of the claimant,
holding that a "contract of employment" is a jurisdictional fact
that must be established by "due process of law"-i. e., by such
evidence as would be required to establish any other contractual
relation.12
8 Tirre v. Bush Terminal Co., 172 App. Div. 386 (N. Y. 1916); and cf.
Drummond v. Isbell-Porter Co., 188 App. Div. 374, 377 (N. Y. 1919).9 Pifumer v. Rheinstein, 187 App. Div. 821 (N. Y. i919); followed in
Profeta v. Retsof Co., 188 App. Div. 383 (N. Y. I919); and-Bonnano v. Metz,
188 App, Div. 38o (N. Y. i919).10 Rheinwald v. Builders' Co., 168 App. Div. 425 (N. Y. i915).
11223 N. Y. 572 (N. Y. 1918).
12 Kackel v. Serviss, i8o App. Div. 54 (N. Y. 1917); followed in Tsan-
gournos v. Smith, i83 App. Div. 751 (N. Y. i918).
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Where some of the operations of the employers involved
were subject to the compensation law and some were not so sub-
ject, awards in favor of the claimants, based upon a presumption
that the employees had been engaged when injured in occupations
subject to the law, there being no evidence to the contrary, have
been uniformly affirmed upon appeal.13
But where the injured person's occupation was shown to
have been not one of those enumerated as subject to the com-
pensation law, an award in favor of the claimant was reversed
upon appeal, on the ground that the occupation in question could
not be presumed to be subject to the act, since the presumption
under §21 applies to facts and not to the construction of the stat-
ute.14
Sec. 21, subdiv. i--Burden of Proof-"Arising out of and in
the Course of."
Where the claimant's evidence to the effect that his injury
was accidental and arose out of and in the course of the employ-
ment was very meager but the defendant did not offer any ex-
planatory evidence whatsoever, an award in favor of the claimant
was affirmed upon appeal (one justice dissenting), partly on the
ground of a presumption under §21.15
Where a workman's death had been caused by his setting
fire to his clothes while on duty in his employer's establishment,
but the exact circumstances of the accident could not be ascer-
tained, an award in favor of his defendants was affirmed upon
appeal, on the ground that the claim is presumed to be within
the law, in the absence of substantial proof to the contrary.1 6
Where a night watchman, who had begun his duties for the
night, was found dead about midnight at the bottom of a well
under a staircase in the building he had to watch, without any
witnesses of the circumstances, an award in favor of his dependents
was affirmed upon appeal (two judges dissenting), on the ground
that there was no substantial evidence to overcome the presump-
tion that death was the result of an accident arising out of and
in the course of the employment.' 7
But where the claimant was shown to have been injured
while on a public highway on his way to work, an award in his
favor, was reversed upon appeal, the Appellate Division holding
that where the undisputed facts show that the injury did not
13 McQueeny v. Sutphen and Myer, 167 App. Div. 518 (N. Y. 1915);
Kohler v. Frohman, 167 App. Div. 5 (N. Y, 19i5S; Larsen v. Paine Drug Co.,
169 App. Div. 838 (N. Y. 1915); Fogarty v. National Biscuit CO., 221 N. Y. 20
(31917); and to simla effect, see Kobyrav Adams, 176 App. Div. 43 (N. Y.1916). 14Tornassi v. Christensen, 17i App. Div. 284 (N. Y. 1916).15 Powley v. Vivian, 169 App. Div. 170 (N. Y. 1915).
16 Chludinskl v. Standard Oil Co., 176 App. Div. 87 (N. Y. 1916).17 Fogarty v. National Biscuit Co., 22z N. Y. 20 (1917); and cf. Driscoll v.
Gillen, 226 N. Y. (I919), three judges dissenting.
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occur in the course of the employment there is no. room for a pre-
sumption under §21 and "the employer is still entitled to his
property until it is taken from him by due process of law."'"
Where a workman employed and living on a dredge in a
river went ashore for recreation, got dead drunk; in that condition
and at night staggered down to the boat-landing and in some
unknown manner was drowned, an award in favor of his dependents
was reversed upon appeal, on the ground that the uncontradicted
evidence clearly overcame the presumption created by §21 and
proved that the accident did not arise in course of the employ-
ment.19
And where a workman employed on a dredge in a river re-
ported for work so violently intoxicated that he was absolutely
unfit for employment and had to be restrained and confined and
then dismissed, after regaining his employer's landing stage fell
therefrom, under unwitnessed circumstances, and was killed, an
award in favor of his dependents was reversed upon appeal, on
the ground that the accident did not arise in the course of his
employment and that under the facts shown there was no presump-
tion to the contrary.0
Sec. 21, subdiv. x-Burden of Proof-"Accidental Injury."
Where a workman died from pneumonia and the shock of
an operation rendered necessary by hernia, and the .evidence showed
that he had recently been medically examined and found free
from hernia, and that in the course of his work, which was heavy,
he had suddenly stopped, complaining of pain, and had gone to his
doctor, who found him then suffering from hernia, an award for
death as the result of an accidental injury was affirmed upon
appeal, on the ground that §21 required the Industrial Commission
to presume that the claim came within the provisions of the act
in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, and that
there was no evidence to the contrary, all the evidence favoring
the presumption.
2'
But where an employee collapsed while sweeping a side-
walk, bumping his head in the fall, and subsequently died, all
the evidence indicating that both the fall and the death were due
to an attack of cardiac syncope, an award in favor of his depen-
dents was reversed, the Appellate Division (one justice dissenting)
holding that there was no evidence to sustain a finding that the
18 McCabe v. Brooklyn R. R. Co., 177 App. Div. 107 (N. Y. 1917); to
somewhat similar effect see Whalen v. Stamwood Towing Co., 186 App. Div.
190 (N. Y. 1919); and cf. Kuy v. Standard Oil Co., 184 App. Div. 453 (N. Y.1918).
'. Berg v. Great Lakes Co., 273 A. D. 8 (N. Y. 1916).
20 Pope v. Merritt & Chapman Co., 177 A. D. 69 (N. Y. 1917).
21 Fleming v. Gair, 176 App. Div. 23 (N. Y. 1916); followed in Gibbons v.
Marx & Rawolle, 181 App. Div. I42 (N. Y. 1917); and cf. Foltz v. Robertson,
x88 App. Div. 359 (N. Y. 1919); and Sullivan v. Industrial Engineering Co.,
173 App. Div. 65 (N. Y. 1916).
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injury was "accidental" or that it "arose out of the employment,"
and that the presumption under §21 does not arise until there is
evidence of the employment, of an injury in the course of the
employment and of the injury as the result of something arising
out of the employment.22
Where an employee suffered an injury by accident, was
operated on therefor and some weeks later, after apparent re-
covery from the operation, died from a preexisting disease, and
there was no evidence that the death in any way or degree resulted
from the accidental injury, an award in favor of the claimant was
reversed upon appeal (one justice dissenting), on the ground that
it would not be presumed, without evidence, that the death re-
sulted from the accident.23
Where the claimant had been disabled by hernia, which
hernia came on while he was engaged in heavy work but without
any strain or unusual exertion, an award in his favor was reversed
by the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the direct connection
between the personal injury as a result and the employment as
its proximate cause "must be proved by facts."
24
And where the claimant had become blind from congenital
syphilis not long after fracturing his leg by accident and there
was some expert opinion evidence that the accident might have
aggravated or accelerated the disease, an award in favor of the.
claimant was reversed upon appeal (two justices dissenting) on
the ground that such evidence was insufficient to bring the case
within the letter of the statute.25
Sec. 21, subdiv. i-Burden of Proof-Degree and Duration of
Disability.
Where an award was made, nine months after injury, for
permanent total loss of use of a foot, although the evidence showed
that the loss of use in fact was far from total and that there was
still some doubt as to the permanency of such partial loss of use,
the award, after affirmance by the Appellate Division, was re-
versed by the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the presump-
tion under §21 had no application to the case, the burden of estab-
lishing permanent total loss of use resting upon the claimant
and the evidence in the case not supporting such conclusion.26
Sec. 21, subdiv. x-Burden of Proof-Dependency.
Where an award to a father and mother as dependents upon
a deceased son was based solely upon evidence that the deceased
had from time to time sent them money, the award was reversed
22Collins v. Brooklyn Gas Co., 171 App. Div. 381 (N. Y. 1916).
23 Tucillo v. Ward Co., 18o App. Div. 3oa (N. Y. 1917).2 4 Alpert v. Powers, 223 N. Y. 97 (i918).25Borgstedt v. Shults Co., i8o App. Div. 229 (N. Y. 1917).
2 6 Modra v. Little, 223 N. Y. 452 (1918); and to similar effect, see Kan-
zar v. Acorn Co., 219 N. Y. 326 (1916).
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upon appeal (one justice dissenting), on the ground that the pre-
sumption under §21 does not apply to claims of dependency; but
that the conditions constituting dependency must be established
by competent proof.27
Sec. 21, subdiv. 2-Burden of Proof-Notice of Accident.
Where a claimant for compensation had failed to give the
written notice required by statute, having merely telephoned his
foreman that he was sick and later told such foreman the nature
of his trouble but not its cause, an award in favor of the claimant,
based upon a ruling that there is a presumption under §21 that
the notice was sufficient, was reversed upon appeal, on the ground
that the presumption disappeared with the establishment of the
fact that the notice required by statute had not been given.2
Reviewing the foregoing decisions it appears that after
nearly five years of burdensome litigation the statutory
provisions under consideration are still far from being defi-
nitely construed. It still remains uncertain whether an
award may be based upon hearsay evidence, uncorroborated
by other evidence. And the practical effect of the pre-
sumption created by §21 is still obscure. For, while in
many of those decisions awards have been affirmed expressly
for want of evidence to overcome the presumption, yet in
others we are told that there is no presumption of dependency
or disability and that, in order to sustain an award, there
must be evidence of the employment, of an injury in the
course of the employment and of an injury as the result of
something arising out of the employment. Statutory pro-
visions resulting in so much litigation and obscurity prima
facie deserve condemnation.
But it is now a subject of complaint among the working-
people that this litigation and uncertainty is largely due to
the courts' adoption of a line of construction contrary to the
"liberal" purposes of the Act. In contrast, as may be
seen from the foregoing summary of decisions, the Industrial
Commission and a minority of the Judges have sought to
construe the statutory provisions in question so liberally
27 Drummond v. Isbell-Porter Co., 188 App. Div. 374; and cf. Birming-
ham v. Westinghouse Co., i8o App. Div. 48 (N. Y. 1907); followed in Fry v.
McLoughlin Bros., 187 App. Div. 824 (N. Y. i919).
2 Dorb v. Stearns, 18o App. Div. 138 (N. Y. 1917).
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as to mean that any assertion of fact in an unsworn claim
for compensation, no matter how improbable or suspicious
in the light of surrounding facts and circumstances, shall
or may be taken as true unless the defendant proves the
negative, and that mere hearsay or secondary evidence in
favor of a claim, howsoever flimsy or suspicious, shall or
may be given greater weight than legal evidence to the
contrary. 9 But the only legitimate object of judicial in-
quiry is truth. And to require or even to authorize a judicial
or quasi-judicial tribunal thus to disregard the rational
criteria of truth would lead inevitably to a substitution of
fiction for fact and a reign of falsehood, chicanery and fraud.
Such result has already been indicated. Among the reversed
cases above cited are a number wherein awards were based
either upon sheer pretense, contrary to the known truth,
or upon evidence "abhorrent to reason and common sense,"
and one at least wherein the best evidence was almost cer-
tainly deliberately withheld. It is self-evident that statu-
tory rules of evidence and proof which would thus pervert
judicial inquiry into a means for avoiding a truthful appli-
cation of the substantive provisions of the law, would violate
the "due process of law" clause of the Federal Constitution.
Consequently, the narrower construction adopted by the
majority of the judges in effect saved the provisions in
question from entire invalidity.
A number of the judges of the appellate courts seem to
have favored the extremely broad construction just criti-
cised, under an impression that they were following prece-
dents and that in Europe the "sociological purposes" of
the compensation law have been deemed to entail a wide
abandonment or relaxation of juridical principles3 0 To show
how slight is the basis for such impression, it is worth while
to run through the compensation law of evidence and proof
29 Cf. dissenting opinion in Driscoll v. Gillen, 187 App. Div. 9o8, in which
case, however, the sustained presumption was a not unreasonable inference
from the facts proved.
30 See dissenting opinion in Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y.
435, at pp. 443-4.
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in the three leading industrial countries of Europe, noting
how closely it adheres to established juridical principles.
In the British statute3' there are no provisions expressly
affecting the general rules of evidence and proof. Under
that statute as constructed by the courts, the burden of
proving an injury by accident, that the accident arose out
of the employment, that it arose in the course of the em-
ployment, and that the injury resulted from the accident,
rests upon the claimant; and where the evidence is equally
consistent with an accident or no accident the burden of
proof has not been discharged.32 The proof need not be
direct but may be by circumstantial evidence; however, there
must be facts proved from which an inference may legiti-
mately be drawn, as distinguished from mere conjecture, sur-
mise or guess; (Barnabas v. Bersham Co., supra). As to
drawing inferences, the general rule is that a finding of fact
by the trial judge will not be disturbed upon appeal unless
it is such as a reasonable man would not have arrived at
from the evidence.
In the French statute34 "there is no express provision af-
fecting the general rules of evidence and proof. Under that
statute as construed by the courts, the burden is upon the
claimant to prove an accident, and the connection between
the employment and the accident and between the accident
and the injury, without derogation from the principles of
''common law"; and where the proof is equally consistent
with an accident or no accident the burden of proof has not
been discharged. 35 Where, however, the exact cause of death
cannot be ascertained, but the facts proved strongly and
31 "Workmen's Compensation Act, 19o6." There is a presumption cre-
ated in this statute, but it relates solely to "industrial diseases."
2 Barnabas v. Bersham Co., (H. of L., 1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 119; Pomfret v.
Lancashire Ry. Co. (1903), 5 M-S. W. C. C. 22; O'Brien v. Star Line (z9o8);
Morgan v. Cynon Co., (I915), 8 B. W. C. C. 499; Hugo v. Larkins, (19IO),
3 B. W. C. C. 288; Paton v. Dixon, (1913), 6 B. W. C. C. 882.
3 Taylor v. Clark, (H. of L., i914), 7 B. W. C. C. 871; Sneddon v. Green-
field, (igio), 3 B. W. C. C. 557.
34Law of April 9, x898, as amended by Laws of March 22, 1902, March 30,
19o5, and April 17, 19o6.
35Cour de Cassation-Chambre Civile, June 1o, z9o2; Chambre des
Requetes, Feb. 29, I9o4, Jan. 19, 1903, April 27, 19o3, and May 4, 1905.
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consistently point to that conclusion the fact of an accident
may be inferred.36 And where an accident is proved to
have occurred during the time and at the place of work,
it is presumed to have been due to the employment in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.
37
In the German statute38 there is no provision expressly
affecting the general rules of evidence and proof. Under
that statute, as applied by the Imperial Insurance Office,
to establish a claim for compensation, it must be proved
that the employment was subject to the law, that there was
an accident, that the accident occurred in the course of the
employment, that the accident was caused by the work,
and that the injury resulted from the accident. 39 Un-
usually strong proof is required to establish a causal rela-
tion between the work and sudden outbreaks of latent
diseases occurring during the work.40 On the other hand,
where workmen are found dead in their work-places and,
under certain conditions, where seamen are found dead in
the water near their ships, and the exact cause of the death
cannot be ascertained but there appears a high degree of
probability that there was an accident due to the employ-
ment, that conclusion will be inferred.4
1
A comparison of European and New York cases in detail
would show that the rule, developed abroad, of drawing
reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence, supple-
menting general presumptions of law, goes about as far in
favor of compensation claimants as does the statutory pre-
sumption in any of the affirmed cases in New Y6rk, the final
38 Chambre des Requetes, July 18, 1904, and July 6, 19o3.
37 Chambre Civile, Feb. 8, 191; Chambre des Requetes, Oct. 25, 1910.
U "Workmen's Insurance Code of July 9, 1911."
" "Handbuch der Unfallversicherung, 1909," pp. 49, 73, 76. The writer
is unable to cite any authority for the proposition that the common rules of
evidence are not relaxed in compensation cases in Germany; but in a fairly wide
study of the authorities he has found no indication that they are.
The writer is unable to cite any authority for the proposition that the
common rules of evidence are not relaxed in compensation cases in Germany;
but in a fairly wide study of the authorities he has found no indication that they
are. 4V Id., pp. 73-76.
4 This inference was cited in the dissenting opinion in Carroll v. Knicker-
bocker Ice Co., supra, as a ground for relaxing the rules of evidence in compen-
sation cases.
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results in all the New York cases being the same as they
probably would have been under English law. Conse-
quently, save upon the improbable assumption that our
Courts would not have followed precedents in sustaining
reasonable inferences from facts proved, those particular
presumptions have been wholly useless for good and yet
productive of much harm.
In the opinion of the writer there is no need or justifica-
tion for any arbitrary presumptions of law in connection
with the accident compensation law.42 Even such an ap-
parently reasonable presumption as that of "dependency,"
created in many American compensation acts in favor of
widows, children, etc., of fatally injured employees, is un-
sound, the proper method of accomplishing the reasonable
purpose intended being to provide that such persons shall,
under conditions specified, be entitled to compensation
whether actually dependent or not. Similarly, in the writer's
opinion, there is no justification for any relaxation of the
principles of evidence in compensation cases. Howsoever
proper it may be to specialize the procedure so as to aid
claimants in the presentation of their cases, to penalize
defendants for unreasonably putting claimants to their proof,
to modify purely technical or arbitrary rules of proof and
to excuse errors in the admission of evidence, yet where an
essential allegation in a claim for compensation is duly
controverted the issue thereby raised ought to be deter-
mined by the universally recognized criteria of truth, as
are issues of fact in other judicial proceedings. The prob-
lem is to find a remedy for unavoidable failure of proof.
To permit the substitution of methods of deception in place
of right methods of proof is no true remedy therefor. The
only reasonable remedy is to give claimants the benefit of
every reasonable doubt in drawing inferences from facts
properly proved.
New York, October, 191g. P. Tecumseh Sherman.
42This sweeping proposition may be subject to qualifications. Under
some conditions it may be expedient to write into the statute law a presumption
the truth of which is established by experience. Such is the presumption as
to the causation of "industrial diseases" created by §8(2) of the British Act.
